A switching cost is what a customer gives up or pays to move from one supplier to another. It can be money, time, effort, a lost benefit or a feeling of risk. Switching costs shape pricing, competition and loyalty. This entry covers the economics and the types. It then turns to the rules that cut them and the way loyalty programs create them.

What are switching costs?

Economist Paul Klemperer defines them in two lines. A buyer who changes supplier pays costs of transactions, learning or money (Klemperer, New Palgrave). The buyer has put effort or cash into the current seller. A new seller would make the buyer repeat it.

His 1995 overview makes the market point. These costs give firms “a degree of market power over their repeat-purchasers” (Klemperer, 1995). A firm’s current market share then shapes its future profit. He also ties them to brand loyalty.

Firms face them too. Klemperer says many of a consumer’s costs of switching have parallels in a firm’s costs of serving new customers. He also counts the start-up cost of a first purchase as a switching cost. A buyer who has never purchased from any firm has to make that first investment.

What are the types of switching costs?

Klemperer lists six sources of switching cost. The table gives each with his own example.

SourceWhat the buyer has invested inKlemperer’s example
EquipmentA physical investment that must stay compatibleCameras with lenses, razors with blades, pens with refills
Relationship setupThe transaction costs of changing suppliersClosing one bank account and opening another
LearningFinding out how to use a productA cook who already knows how to prepare one cake mix
InformationFinding out about a product’s characteristicsRe-using a medicine that has worked
Artificial investmentA first unit that makes later units cheaperFrequent-flyer programs and discount coupons
PsychologicalA felt preference for what one already usesLiking one’s own mother’s cooking

Each source alone can make identical products behave as if they differ after a first purchase. Many markets have more than one at work. Klemperer adds that changing long-distance phone service can be costly, and so can returning rented equipment to rent the same kind from another firm.

Are switching costs good or bad?

For buyers, they usually cost money. Klemperer’s analysis finds that switching costs raise prices in general (Klemperer, 1995). They can also keep new firms out. A later essay says they raise firms’ profits and lower consumer and social welfare (New Palgrave). His policy view starts from a presumption that governments should discourage them, with exceptions. He names airline frequent-flyer programs as one case.

Not every switching cost is a social loss. For discount devices, he notes that the costs “are simply transfers between consumers and firms.” A customer who leaves forfeits value the firm gave them. That is the earned kind.

For firms, the payoff is pricing power. Morningstar lists switching costs among five sources of economic moat. When stopping is too expensive or troublesome, “that indicates pricing power” (Morningstar). It rates a firm’s moat as wide if its advantages should last more than 20 years, and narrow at 10 years.

Fred Reichheld of Bain adds that retained customers often pay a premium to stay with a supplier they know (Bain).

Porter’s Five Forces shows the buyer’s side. Buyer power is highest when there are few switching costs. A supplier group wields more power if switching suppliers is expensive or time consuming. The threat of a substitute is high when the buyer’s cost of switching to it is low (HBS ISC). Michael Porter first described the five forces in a 1979 Harvard Business Review article.

How do regulators reduce switching costs?

Regulators go after costs that firms impose. US law defines number portability as the ability to keep a phone number when switching carriers (47 U.S.C. 153). It gives carriers a duty to provide it (47 U.S.C. 251).

The EU Data Act will entirely remove switching charges for cloud and data services from 12 January 2027 (European Commission). In the UK, the CMA found in 2016 that only 3% of personal customers switch bank in any year. They could save £92 a year on average. Current accounts have no annual renewal date to prompt a review (CMA).

How do loyalty programs create switching costs?

Programs build switching costs from value the member has earned. Two Australian researchers write that members feel tied to the firm because they fear surrendering earned benefits. They call it a special case of financial switching cost. Status adds to it, since benefits improve with each level. They also caution that these purchase decisions “should not be mistaken as true loyalty” (Mathies and Gudergan).

Starbucks Rewards shows the mechanics. Green Level Stars expire six months after the month earned unless the member stays active. Gold and Reserve Stars do not expire while the member keeps that status. Keeping Gold takes 500 new Stars in 12 months. Reaching Reserve takes 2,500 new Stars in the 12 months after Gold (Starbucks terms).

Costco’s renewal rate was 92.3% in the US and Canada at the end of 2025. Executive members earn a 2% reward on qualified purchases, up to $1,250 a year (Costco 10-K).

Rivals answer with status match. Atmos Rewards offers equivalent status for 90 days to members of other listed airline programs. It is a one-time offer for the life of an account. To keep the status, the member must earn base points on Alaska and Hawaiian flights within 90 days (Alaska Airlines). Virgin Atlantic’s Flying Club promises status “in an instant” to top-tier members of other airlines. It asks for a future flight booked with it or a codeshare partner (Virgin Atlantic). A match cuts the cost of leaving.

For illustration, a traveler holds 60,000 points worth $600 and a status that saves $400 a year in perks. Moving to a rival forfeits $1,000 of value. A status match restores the perks, so the net cost falls to $600. The program then has to keep earning the traveler’s spend.

The design rule follows from the cases above. Costs a member earns are loyalty design. Costs a firm imposes through friction invite regulators. Build the first kind. Ask two questions of each rule. What does the member lose by leaving, and did the member earn it? Then ask whether a rival can match it.

How GRAVTY handles switching costs

Tier, expiry and bonus rules are the program’s switching costs, and a team can change them. GRAVTY’s patented Visual Rules let non-technical users write earn, burn, tier and bonus logic. They simulate it and deploy it without an IT ticket (financial services solutions).

Operators face switching costs too. Replacing a loyalty platform is a big one. lji.io says GRAVTY Ascend turns that move from a leap of faith into a controlled, observable transition. It lists 300M+ members migrated and 150+ systems integrated (Loyalty Juggernaut clients).

WestJet moved WestJet Rewards off Siebel and onto GRAVTY. Its year-end rollover now takes 28 hours, down from 10 days. Members kept earning throughout (airline solutions). Our loyalty platform migration guide covers the planning.

Frequently asked questions

What is an example of a switching cost?

Closing one bank account and opening another is a standard example. Klemperer notes that two banks can offer identical accounts. Moving from one to the other still carries high transaction costs. Giving up frequent-flyer rewards is a second example.

Are loyalty programs a switching cost?

Yes, a program creates switching costs through the points and status a member would lose. Mathies and Gudergan call fear of surrendering earned benefits a special case of financial switching cost (Mathies and Gudergan). The member earned that cost, which sets it apart from a fee to cancel.

What are low switching costs?

Low switching costs mean a buyer can change suppliers easily and cheaply. Porter’s framework says buyer power is highest when there are few switching costs (HBS ISC). Firms in those markets compete on price and quality because they cannot count on inertia.

Are switching costs illegal?

No, switching costs are not illegal in general. Rules target some of them. The EU Data Act ends switching charges for data services from 12 January 2027. US law requires carriers to let people keep their phone numbers. Klemperer’s call to discourage frequent-flyer programs is an academic view. It is not a rule.

How can a rival offset a program’s switching cost?

A rival can offer a status match. It recreates the status a member would lose. Atmos Rewards gives equivalent status for 90 days to members of other listed airlines, once per account. The incumbent can answer with new value, such as faster earn or better perks.